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Abstract
This paper discusses how capital income taxation aﬀects economic
growth and welfare in an endogenously growing world economy with
perfect capital mobility and worldwide externalities. Worldwide ex-
ternalities provide a mechanism for equalizing national growth rates
even with diﬀerent capital income tax rates. The welfare of future
generations is more inﬂuenced by a change in the growth rate than by
the international spillover eﬀect which has been the primary concern
of the previous studies. Moreover, our model ﬁnds intergenerational
conﬂicts arising from the change in the growth rate caused by a change
in the source tax rate of the foreign country.
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11 Introduction
In the era of the highly integrated world capital market, we have to take
into account the international spillover eﬀects of capital taxation even when
discussing domestic tax policy. Most studies of tax policy in a two country
model with perfect capital mobility - including Ihori (1991), Sibert (1990)
and Sorensen (1990) - show international conﬂicts created by a source tax
reform. A source tax makes investment in a foreign country more attractive.
Therefore, the capital stock shifts from the home country to the foreign
country (we call this a “capital allocation eﬀect”). The source tax also lowers
the total capital stock of the world economy (we call this a “capital formation
eﬀect”) because the two countries, when aggregated, can be regarded as a
closed economy when viewing tax eﬀects on the world wide equilibrium.
When the foreign country raises the source tax rate, the capital inﬂow due to
the capital allocation eﬀect dominates a decrease in capital due to the capital
formation eﬀect (Ihori, 1991, Sorensen, 1990). Therefore an increase in the
source tax rate decreases the capital stock in the home country and increases
it in the foreign country. The welfare eﬀect of source taxes is positive on the
foreign country and negative on the home country (Sibert, 1990).1
In the present paper, we will tell a diﬀerent story by examining an over-
lapping generations model which allows that the growth rate is determined
endogenously. We claim that the tax eﬀects previously known in the exoge-
nous growth models are actually divided into the growth rate eﬀect and the
level eﬀect once the long run growth rate is endogenized.
The capital formation eﬀect in the endogenous growth model appears as
a decline of the growth rate of the economy, thus it is a growth rate eﬀect.
In contrast, the capital allocation eﬀect is a level eﬀect. In endogenous
growth models, the capital allocation eﬀect will be dominated by the capital
formation eﬀect in the long run, because the latter is growing over time.
Therefore, economic eﬀects and welfare consequences diﬀe rf r o mt h ec a s eo f
1This result holds when the current accounts of the two countries are balanced initially.
Sibert (1990) stresses that the existence of large initial current account imbalances may
reverse these welfare implications.
2exogenous growth, where the capital allocation eﬀect is always dominant.
Considering an overlapping generation model, this paper sheds light on
the intergenerational conﬂicts of capital income tax reforms. In exogenous
growth models, residence and source taxes show a sharp contrast in regard
to the international spillover eﬀect on welfare. In our endogenous growth
model, these tax changes aﬀect the national growth rate. Therefore, their
eﬀect on welfare is ampliﬁed as time goes on. The capital allocation eﬀect
of source tax favors the foreign country, as Ihori (1991) and Sorensen (1990)
show. At the time of a source tax reform, this eﬀe c ti sd o m i n a n ti nt h e
foreign country. However, this welfare improvement of the foreign country
will be dominated later by the harmful welfare eﬀect caused by the growth
rate reduction. The welfare of foreign country will therefore decline in the
long run. This is a story of intergenerational conﬂicts of capital income tax
reforms; an increase in the source tax rate makes the foreign country’s agents
better oﬀ in the short-run, but it reduces the welfare of future generations in
both countries.
In this paper we build the simplest possible model to feature the above
story. The world economy consists of identical two countries. Each gener-
ation lives for two periods. There are Arrow (1962) - Romer (1986) style
knowledge spillovers across borders. The presence of a particular kind of
knowledge spillover makes endogenous growth possible and eliminates tran-
sition dynamics. In this setting we examine the eﬀects of residence and source
taxes on the growth rate and capital stock of each country. The welfare of
all future generations is also calculated.
2 The Model
There are two countries, which are identical except for taxes. We call one the
home country and the other the foreign country. In order to avoid duplicating
descriptions we show equations only for the home country. An asterisk is
a d d e dt ot h ef o r e i g nc o u n t e r p a r t s .T h e r ei sn op o p u l a t i o ng r o w t h ,a n dt h e
size of the population is normalized to 1 in each country.
32.1 Production
One of the mechanisms of endogenous growth is represented by the Arrow
(1962) - Romer (1986) type “knowledge spillover” model. A typical setting
of the aggregate production function in this type of models is
Yt = F(Kt,K tN), (1)
where K and N(= 1) represent capital stock and labor in the country, re-
spectively. Here the eﬃciency of labor is improved by “learning-by-doing”
work, which is assumed to be related to the ﬁrm’s physical capital stock.
Knowledge prevails among the ﬁrms within the country without any cost.
An implicit assumption here is that the knowledge does not spill over across
countries at all. However, in reality the country boarder might not be crucial
t od e t e r m i n et h ea r e aw h e r et h ek n o w l e d g ec a np r e v a i l .W h e nt h ep r o d u c t i o n
externalities are assumed to work across borders, the production function is
then speciﬁed as
Yt = F(Kt, ¯ KtN), (2)
where ¯ K represents the world wide capital stock (= K + K∗).2 Assuming
that this production function is homogeneous of degree one with respect to
K and ¯ KN, we can rewrite (2) as
Yt = F(Kt/ ¯ KtN,1) ¯ KtN = F(Kt/ ¯ Kt,1) ¯ Kt ≡ f(αt) ¯ Kt, (3)
where αt ≡ Kt/ ¯ Kt. As (3) shows, output of one country is written as a
function of the world-wide capital rather than the capital stock installed in
t h ec o u n t r y .T h i sf o r m u l aw i l lb eh e l p f u lw h e nw ef o c u so nt h ed y n a m i c so f
the world economy.
Perfect competition in factor markets implies
rt =( 1− σ)f
0(αt) (4)
wt = f(αt) ¯ Kt − f
0(αt)Kt, (5)
where σ, r and w are the source tax rate, the interest rate and the wage,
respectively.
2The world wide capital stock is regarded as exogenous by ﬁr m si nb o t hc o u n t r i e s .
42.2 Households
The consumption behavior is the same as the standard overlapping genera-
tions model. Homogenous households in each of the two countries live for
two periods. In the ﬁrst period they supply a ﬁxed unit of labor and, in the
second period, they retire. The utility function of generation t in the home











t stands for the consumption of generation s in period t, et+1 is the
level of public goods at the old and δ is a discount rate. Moreover, u is
assumed to be homothetic. Households take the supply of public goods as
exogenous. The budget constraint is
c
t
t + Kt+1 + Bt+1 = wt (7)
c
t
t+1 =[ 1+( 1− ρ)rt+1]Kt+1 +[ 1+( 1− ρ)r
∗
t+1]Bt+1, (8)
where B is the foreign asset, ρ t h er e s i d e n c et a xr a t eo ft h eh o m ec o u n t r y ,
respectively.
Perfect capital mobility implies
(1 − ρ)rt+1 =( 1− ρ)r
∗
t+1,




From (6)-(9) and the homotheticity of u, we obtain the following saving
function:
St ≡ wt − c
t
t = s(βt+1)wt, (10)
where s(βt+1) i st h ep r o p e n s i t yt os a v ew i t hr e s p e c tt ol i f et i m ei n c o m ea n d
β is the after-tax interest rate deﬁned as
βt+1 =( 1− ρ)(1 − σ)f
0(αt+1). (11)
We assume here that the sign of s0(β) is positive, because it carries the same
implications as the standard Ramsey type model.
52.3 The Government
The home government taxes capital income in each period and spends the
total tax revenues on public goods, which give beneﬁts for the old generation
in the home country. Thus, the public policy is neutral to intergenerational
income distribution. The government budget is assumed to be always bal-
anced. With (4), (7), (10) and (11), the government budget constraint is
et+1 = ρrt+1St +
σ
1 − σ
rt+1Kt+1 = ρrt+1Bt+1 +[ f
0(αt+1) − βt+1]Kt+1 ≡ e ¯ Kt,
(12)
where
e ≡ ρ(1 − σ)f
0 (α){s(β)[f (α) − f
0 (α)α] − α(1 + g)}+[f
0 (α) − β]α(1 + g).
(13)
2.4 Market Equilibrium
The world market equilibrium condition is given by
Kt+1 + K
∗
t+1 = St + S
∗
t, (14)
because B + B∗ =0 .
2.5 The Dynamics of the Model







The following equation obviously holds from the deﬁnitions of α and ¯ K :
αt + α
∗
t =1 . (16)
( 1 5 )a n d( 1 6 )d e t e r m i n eu n i q u ev a l u e so fα and α∗ for given σ and σ∗.N o t e
that if σ and σ∗ remain constant over time, then the values of α and α∗
also remain unchanged, and, thus, the (before-resident-tax) interest rate is
kept constant. From (11) and the fact that α is a function of σ and σ∗,
6we observe that the after-tax interest rate, β, is determined solely by ρ, σ
and σ∗. When all tax rates are constant, β is also kept constant. Like the
AK production technology, the after-tax interest rate is independent of the
amount of saving. Furthermore, from (5) and the deﬁnition of ¯ K,t h ew a g e ,
w, can be represented as
wt =[ f(α) − f
0(α)α] ¯ Kt, (17)
which implies that the wage is proportional to ¯ K.
Substituting (17) into (10) gives the home country saving function:
St = s(β)[f(α) − f
0(α)α] ¯ Kt. (18)
The foreign counterpart is obtained similarly. From (14) and (18) and the
deﬁnition of ¯ K, the dynamics of the world capital stock will be represented
as






∗]} ¯ Kt ≡ (1 + g) ¯ Kt,
(19)
where g i st h eg r o w t hr a t eo ft h ew o r l dc a p i t a ls t o c k .T h ed y n a m i c so ff o r e i g n
asset holdings, B, is given by
Bt+1 = St − α ¯ Kt+1 ≡ b ¯ Kt, (20)
where
b ≡ s(β)[f(α) − f
0(α)α] − α(1 + g). (21)
Therefore, the dynamics of the world capital and foreign assets are linear and
one dimensional.
Like other endogenous growth models, some assumption is needed for
the growth of the world economy to be sustainable, so we assume g>0.
Intuitively speaking, in order for the capital stock to grow, the propensity to
save for future consumption has to be suﬃciently large in our model, where
the life-cycle saving of households constitutes the capital stock.
72.6 The Eﬀects of Taxation on Interest Rates
Table 1 summarizes how capital income taxes aﬀect the location of capital
and the before- and after-tax interest rates. Since residence tax is designed
to be neutral to investor’s decisions on the location of capital, it does not
aﬀect the location of capital on the before-tax interest rate. From (11), the
residence tax just lowers the after-tax interest rate faced by residents. The
residence tax in the foreign country has no eﬀect on the interest rate in the
home country.
Table 1: Tax Eﬀects on Capital Allocation and Interest Rates
Residence-based tax Source-based tax
Home Foreign Home Foreign
Allocation of capital (α)0 0
f0(α)
2f00(α) < 0 −
f0(α)
2f00(α) > 0
Before-tax interest rate (f0(α))0 0
f0(α)
2 > 0 −
f0(α)
2 < 0
After-tax interest rate (β) −f0(α) < 0 0 −
f0(α)
2 < 0 −
f0(α)
2 < 0
A source tax distorts the allocation of capital. An increase in the source
tax rate shifts the capital stock from the home country to the foreign country,
because the capital in the home country must earn a higher return due to
the source tax. The before-tax interest rate, or the marginal productivity of
capital, in the home country is increased in the home country and decreased
in the foreign country.
The after-tax interest rate is decreased in both countries. Since the bur-
den of source tax spreads over two countries, the derivative of the domestic
after-tax interest rate with respect to the source tax rate is exactly half of
that with respect to the residence tax rate.
83 Capital Income Taxation and Growth Rate
and Income Diﬀerentials
This section analyzes the eﬀects of international diﬀerences in capital income
tax rates on growth rate and income level diﬀerentials.
3.1 Growth Rate Diﬀerentials
As Rebelo (1991) and Buiter and Kletzer (1991, 1993) argue, diﬀerences in
residence tax rates across countries have been regarded as one of the most
important factors for international growth rate diﬀerentials. However, this
does not hold in our model. Even if there are asymmetries in residence tax
rates (and source tax rates) across countries, the growth rate of each country
is always equalized. Let us verify this point.
From (3), the home and foreign countries’ GDP, Y and Y ∗,a r eg i v e nb y
Y = f(α) ¯ K (22)
Y
∗ = f(α
∗) ¯ K. (23)
These reduced form production functions resemble Rebelo’s (1991) AK tech-
nology, since α is constant. Due to the international knowledge spillover,
the total capital stock of the world economy becomes a determinant of the
production activities for each country. Since a country which invests less
capital can enjoy the spillover from the investment by the other country, less
investment in a jurisdiction is no longer a handicap for growth. This is a
very diﬀerent implication from Rebelo (1991), while his and our model both
belong to a class of AK technology. In Rebelo (1991), where there is no
international spillover at all, the GDP in each country depends in turn on
the capital stock in each country. Thus, a lower rate of capital accumulation
leads to a lower growth rate of GDP.
The capital allocation across borders in Rebelo’s (1991) AK model is on a
knife-edge: the country with the highest return of capital attracts all capital
i nt h ew o r l d .T h i ss o m e w h a tu n r e a l i s t i cp h e n o m e n o nd o e sn o te m e r g ei no u r
9model, because our speciﬁcation exhibits a property of “decreasing return”
to the amount of capital relative to the world-wide capital stock.
Buiter and Kletzer (1991, 1993) construct a two-country model in which
the growth rates are not equalized even under perfect capital mobility. Their
results diﬀer from ours because their model introduces human capital, which
is immobile across countries. The accumulation of human capital in the
home country raises only the marginal productivity of capital in the home
country, because human capital has no external eﬀects to the other country’s
productivity. In our model, however, the externalities in production raise the
marginal productivities of capital in both countries.
3.2 T h eG r o w t hR a t eE ﬀect of Taxation
We next examine the eﬀects of capital income taxation on the growth rate
of the world economy. Our policy experiments consider permanent increases
in tax rates in period 1. This change is announced before the generation
born in period 0 (the ﬁrst generation aﬀected by the policy change) plans
their consumption schedule,3 so that they or their oﬀsprings are not forced
to revise their plan in the middle of their lifetime. In other words, our policy
exercise is an anticipated permanent change in tax rates. Therefore, a given
K0 and (19) determine the dynamics of K under the new tax rate. Because
our one dimensional dynamic model does not have any transitional processes,
the economy then goes on a new balanced growth path.
A closer look at generational consequences of the policy change is in
order. Responding to a change in the after-tax interest rate, the generation
born in period 0 makes a diﬀerent saving plan from the previous generations.
The resulting change in capital accumulation aﬀects the wage earned by the
generation born in period 1. Thus the policy change aﬀects the generations
born in period 1 or later through a change in the wage and the after-tax
interest rates.
T a xp o l i c ya ﬀects the common growth rate of the two countries. From
3How early this announcement is does not matter, because the preceeding generations,
without intergenerational linkages, are not aﬀected by the policy change.
10(19), the growth rate can be represented as a function of the after-tax interest
rate and the allocation of capital:







which implies that the capital tax aﬀects the growth rate of the world econ-
omy through the eﬀects on α and β. If two countries are initially symmetric,
a change in the allocation of capital between countries has a null eﬀect on
the growth rate, because the marginal increase in output of one country is
exactly oﬀset by the marginal decrease in output of the other country. There-
f o r e ,w ec a nf o c u so n l yo nt h et a xe ﬀect on the after-tax interest rate when
examining the growth eﬀect. When the saving increases with the interest
rate, a drop in the after-tax interest rate lowers the growth rate through a
reduction of the amount of saving.
The residence tax lowers the saving of only the home country, because
it does not aﬀect the after-tax interest rate faced by the households in the
foreign country. While the source tax lowers the saving of both countries,
its impact on each country is a half as large as the eﬀect of residence tax,
a ss h o w ni nT a b l e1 .I ti m p l i e st h a tt h et o t a lg r o w t he ﬀect is equal between
residence and source tax. This equivalence is not surprising because, in
the world economy, where total saving equals total investment, there is no
diﬀerence in the eﬀect on the interest rate between residence (saving) tax and
source (investment) tax; the world economy behaves like a closed economy
for this exercise.
A formal derivation of growth eﬀe c t si so b t a i n e db yd i ﬀerentiating (24)















113.3 The Eﬀects of Taxation on the GDP and GNI
Level Diﬀerentials
T a xp o l i c ym a yb eas o u r c eo fi n c o m el e v e ld i ﬀerentials. Let us examine the
tax eﬀects on income on a steady growth path. From (16), (22) and (23) the










Since, as shown in Table 1, an increase in the source tax rate shifts capi-
tal stock to the foreign country, a lower home GDP, relative to the foreign
GDP, is associated with a higher home source tax rate. On the other hand,
residence tax does not create any international diﬀerences in GDP, because
residence tax does not aﬀect α.
We next consider the eﬀects of taxation on the GNI (Gross National
Income) ratio between the two countries. GNI, which was formerly called
GNP in the old System of National Accounts, is the sum of GDP and the
interest receipts from (or payments to) the other country :
Y + rB =
∙






Since residence tax does not aﬀect GDP, its eﬀect on GNI comes from changes
in the net foreign asset. Residence tax lowers the saving of residents, and
thus GNI of the home country will decline. Moreover, since the world GDP
is not aﬀected by residence tax given the world wide capital stock, a decline
in GNI in one country leads to a rise of GNI in the other country.
T h ec a s eo fs o u r c et a xi sm o r ec o m p l i c a t e d ,b e c a u s eb o t hG D Pa n dt h e
net foreign asset are aﬀected. Diﬀerentiating the bracket term in (26) with













The eﬀect of source tax on the net foreign asset can be decomposed into three
parts. The ﬁrst eﬀe c ti st h r o u g ht h ec h a n g ei nt h ea f t e r - t a xi n t e r e s tr a t e .
12Since it depresses the saving of both countries equally, net asset positions are
not changed. The second eﬀect comes directly from the capital allocation
eﬀect. The capital outﬂow due to source tax results in an increase in the
net foreign asset. Since the capital outﬂow also decreases GDP, however, the
combined eﬀects of capital inﬂow on GNI is neutral. The remaining eﬀect,
which ultimately changes GNI, comes from a change in the wage rate caused
by the capital outﬂow. When the home country raises the source tax rate, a
lower share of the country’s capital stock in the world economy has a negative
eﬀect on wage income and, consequently, on GNI.
A formal derivation of the above argument is as follows. Diﬀerentiating
the bracket term in (26) with respect to σ and substituting results presented





























T h ef o r e i g nc o u n t e r p a r to ft h eb r a c k e tt e r mi n( 2 6 )i si n c r e a s e db yac h a n g e
in the source tax rate, because the world GNI is unchanged by the source
tax reform. Thus an increase in source tax lowers GNI of the home country
and raises that of the foreign country through the capital allocation eﬀect.
4W e l f a r e A n a l y s i s
Finally, we analyze the welfare implications of capital tax reform. The eﬀects
on the welfare are slightly diﬀerent from those on GNI, because GNI aggre-
gates the incomes of diﬀerent generations. The welfare of each generation
depends on wage income, the after-tax interest rate and the supply of public
goods.
W ec a l c u l a t et h ew e l f a r ec h a n g eo fe a c hg e n e r a t i o na f t e rt h er e f o r m .T h i s
sort of analysis can be cumbersome in most overlapping generation models.
Since the dynamic path of our model immediately exhibits a balanced growth,
the welfare of each generation will increase with the constant growth rate.
13By virtue of this property we will obtain the tax eﬀect on each generation
with a single equation.
4.1 Welfare Eﬀects of an Increase in the Residence
Tax Rate
The indirect utility function is useful to evaluate the welfare eﬀect. Noticing
from (12) that public goods grow at the same rate as capital (g),w ec a n












,[f (α) − f
0 (α)α](1+g)
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An increase in the residence tax rate aﬀects the utility level through a
lower g,al o w e rβ and a higher e. The decline in the growth rate lowers
the welfare of the subsequent generations. An important fact is that this
negative eﬀect on welfare is magniﬁed as time goes on since later generations
suﬀer more from declines in wages caused by the decrease in the economic
growth rate in all the proceeding periods. In exogenous growth models,
the capital formation eﬀect results in a lower capital-labor ratio, which is
n o tm u l t i p l i c a t i v eo nt i m e . T h et r a n s f o r mf r o mt h el e v e le ﬀect under an
exogenous growth to the growth rate eﬀect under an endogenous growth
does not alter the qualitative implications of the welfare eﬀect of residence
tax. However, it will play an important role in deriving a story about source
tax reform, as shown in the next subsection.
Tax reform also aﬀects the welfare through a decrease in the after-tax
interest rate and an increase in the supply of public goods. They reﬂects the
marginal costs and beneﬁts of public goods. Since these parts of policy eﬀects
are not relevant directly to our focus, we ignore them in the current analysis.
Appendix 1 veriﬁes that if the tax revenues are assumed to be refunded to
the older generations with a lump-sum fashion, these two eﬀects cancel each
other.
Appendix 1 also shows that the welfare eﬀects of residence tax under an
14additional assumption is given by
dV t/dρ
V2(1 + g)t−1 ¯ K0
+
det+1/dρ
V2 (1 + g)
t−1 ¯ K0






V2(1 + g)t−1 ¯ K0




where V2 is the marginal utility of lifetime income. (29) and (30) conﬁrm the
narrative analysis shown above.
4.2 Welfare Eﬀects of an Increase in the Source Tax
Rate
The welfare eﬀects of changes in the source tax rates comes from two chan-
nels: the capital formation eﬀect and the capital allocation eﬀect. The capital
allocation eﬀect represents that source tax decreases the capital stock in the
home country. As suggested in the standard argument of dynamic eﬃciency,
if the interest rate is greater than the growth rate, the decrease in capi-
tal stock leads to a lower welfare level. This is why source tax hurts home
households. The households of the foreign country are made better oﬀ due
to the capital inﬂow from the home country. The welfare eﬀects caused by
the capital shift are opposite across the borders.
T h eh i g h e rs o u r c et a xr a t ea l s ol o w e r st h eg r o w t hr a t eo ft h ew o r l de c o n -
omy, and thus, the welfare level of later generations is reduced by the tax
reform. The capital formation eﬀect grows over time like the case of residence
tax. Therefore, source tax hurts both countries in the long-run. International
conﬂicts, caused by the capital allocation eﬀect and stressed in the exogenous
growth context, fade away in our model.
A combination of the growth rate eﬀect and the level eﬀect creates inter-
generational conﬂicts, along with short-run international conﬂicts, in source
tax reforms. Figure 1 illustrates total eﬀects of source tax reform on the wel-
fare level of foreign households. The horizontal axes are the index of cohorts.
Since (28) implies that the utility of each cohort is governed by the wage, the
welfare level grows with the rate of g. In order to depict the welfare level over
15time as a straight line, the vertical axis measures the natural logarithm of
utility. The magnitude of welfare gain due to capital inﬂo w si sp r o p o r t i o n a l
to the world capital stock. Panel (a) shows that an increase in the tax rate
shifts the utility line upward. The capital formation eﬀect makes the utility
line ﬂatter, as shown in Panel (b).
Combining these two eﬀects, Panel (c) shows the total change in welfare,
which is measured by the horizontal axis. In a typical case, early gener-
ations are made better oﬀ because the capital allocation eﬀect dominates,
but later generations are hurt because the growing capital formation eﬀect
becomes suﬃciently large. The break-even point varies with the underlying
parameters of the model, although we do not give an explicit analysis.
The exact forms of welfare eﬀects of source taxation to generations born
after period 1 are calculated as follows:
dV t/dσ
V2(1 + g)t−1 ¯ K0
+
det+1/dρ
V2 (1 + g)
t−1 ¯ K0
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The welfare of generation 0 is not changed due to the following reason. As
expressed in Section 3.2, the policy change does not aﬀect their wages. In
other words, the constant terms in (31) and (32) are dropped. Since they
are the ﬁrst generation after the new policy, they have not suﬀered from the
growth rate eﬀect either.
5 Discussion
Our model and analysis have been tuned up to an exposition of intergenera-
tional conﬂicts caused by the source tax reform. The model exhibits several
attractive features. While a constant returns to the world capital makes en-
dogenous growth possible, decreasing returns to the relative share of capital
describes realistic movements of capital across borders. The welfare eﬀects
is easily scrutinized by virtue of the one dimensional dynamics of the model.
16As usual, these properties depend on several simplifying and restrictive as-
sumptions. In this section, we discuss how alternative speciﬁcations and
assumptions inﬂuence our results.
5.1 Asymmetric case
Many parts of the calculation beneﬁt from the assumption that the two coun-
tries are symmetric and that there are no taxes initially. We do not defend
symmetric assumptions because allowing diﬀerent preference and technology
between countries derives a variety of outcomes, and gives little insight into
what is an essential eﬀect of taxation.
The existing literature on international taxation like Frenkel and Razin
(1989), Iwamoto and Shibata (1999), and Sibert (1990) points out that some
results depend on a foreign asset position. Since we eliminate some terms in
equations for the welfare eﬀect of the source tax reform with taking b =0 ,
our result may be altered when the initial net foreign asset position is not
zero. As is seen from the analysis in Appendix 2, the eliminated term has
a positive eﬀect on the welfare when the initial net foreign position asset is
negative. When the home country is a net debtor, an increase in the source
tax increases revenues from foreign investors. This income transfer from the
foreign country beneﬁts the households in the home country, thereby working
as an oﬀsetting eﬀect against the reduction of wage due to the capital shift
to the foreign country. If the initial debt is suﬃciently large, the source tax
improves the welfare of the home country and hurts the foreign country at
the early stage of reform. Note, however, that since the income transfer eﬀect
is the level eﬀect, the growth rate eﬀect will dominate the income transfer
eﬀect and the capital allocation eﬀect. Therefore, the long-term consequences
are independent of foreign asset positions. In this case, an intergenerational
conﬂict arises in the home country.
175.2 The way to refund tax revenues
Since we assume tax revenues are used to ﬁnance public goods, the welfare
eﬀect of public goods disturbed our welfare analysis. We simpliﬁed formulas
for the welfare eﬀects by ignoring the terms coming from the marginal beneﬁt
of public goods and the marginal utility of income at the old. This procedure
is justiﬁed if these two terms are equal. This condition is not satisﬁed in
general under the current policy rule, but it holds if tax revenues are refunded
to the old with a lump-sum manner. Readers may complain that we should
have started from the assumption of the lump-sum refund to immediately
obtain the simpliﬁed formulas. However, this alternative way has its costs.
Since the lifetime income of households under the alternative policy rule
depends on the refund at the old, the counterpart of (24), which represents
the growth rate, becomes very complicated, and the calculation of growth
eﬀects and subsequent analysis would become cumbersome. Moreover, even
in the alternative case we can show that essentially the same results are
obtained by performing nasty calculations. Hence we preferred to employ
the current setting.
5.3 Speciﬁcations of Spillovers
The presence of cross-border knowledge spillover is crucial to our story of
international conﬂicts. Since labor is immobile across borders in our model,
it might be reasonable that the knowledge embodied into the human capital
is diﬃcult to spill over across borders. On the other hand, several studies
have suggested that the knowledge can spill over across borders through
patent licensing, foreign direct investment and international trade of goods.
A convincing, general, speciﬁcation shall be:
Yt = F(Kt,(Kt + θK
∗
t )N), (33)
where θ represents a kind of the “distance” between the two countries, or the
degree of cross-border knowledge spillovers.4 It would be natural to assume
4Speciﬁcations of knowledge sipllovers have been concerned by the preceding literature
on sipllovers within countries. See Grilliches (1992) for a survey on empirical issues.
18that 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. The previous literature, like Buiter and Kletzer (1991,
1993) and Razin and Yuen (1994, 1996), has not considered the cross-border
spillover. Thus, they can be considered as an extreme case of the general
setting presented by (1), while the present paper focuses on the other extreme
case, θ =1 .
In this general formula, the production function can be transformed as:
Yt = F(α,α + θα
∗)Kt.
As is easily seen from this reduced form production function, wage income
depends on the world capital stock unless θ =0 , and, hence, the convergence
in growth rates occurs. Although the analysis of the general form becomes
complicated, we see no particular mechanism which may fundamentally re-
verse our conclusions of policy eﬀects.
Eaton and Kortum (1995, 1997) assume that technology diﬀuses inter-
nationally with lags. It plays an important role in describing medium-term
movements of productivity, which is the focus of their papers. Since a unit
of period in our model is a generation, however, we do not believe that ig-
noring sluggish diﬀusion here is a fatal drawback. By the same token, the
adjustment cost of investment, which is stressed by Bernstein and Mohnen
(1998), may be safely ignored.
S of a rw eh a v ec o n s i d e r e dal i n e a rs p e c i ﬁcation to capture international
spillover of capital accumulation externalities. Alternatively, Alogoskouﬁs
and van der Ploeg (1991) and Coe and Helpman (1995), among others, as-
sume the level of world-wide knowledge is captured well by a geometric av-





This form with the Cobb-Douglas production function is convenient to em-
pirical research, because taking a logarithm yields a linear equation.
It is easy to show that even in this setting, we can analyze the eﬀects of
capital income taxation in a similar way to that in Section 2. Now we can
rewrite the production function as:
Y = F(K/ ¯ KN,1) ¯ KN ≡ f(γ) ¯ K, (34)
19where γ is deﬁned as:
γ ≡ K/ ¯ K =( K/K
∗)
1−θ.
Because γ is a geometric average, instead of the sum of each country’s capital,
we have the following relation between γ and γ∗ :
γγ
∗ =1 . (35)
S i n c ew ec a nd e t e r m i n eu n i q u ec o n s t a n tv a l u e so fγ and γ∗ in a similar way
to that in Section 2, the social production function, (34), is again reduced
to an AK technology. The eﬀects of source tax changes on the allocation
of capital and before-tax rate are easily derived from (35) and the arbitrage
equation.
Moreover, it is easy to show that the dynamics of world capital under this




















Assuming symmetry of the two countries, we can analyze the growth rate and
welfare eﬀects of capital income taxation by using this diﬀerence equation.
6 Relations to the Existing Literature
6.1 International Taxation in Exogenous Growth Mod-
els
Theoretical literature on international taxation has contrasted the eﬀects of
residence-based taxation and source-based taxation. Using small open econ-
omy models, Bovenberg (1992), Iwamoto and Shibata (1991), Nielsen and
Sorensen (1991) and Summers (1988) emphasize that these principles are
related to the diﬀerent implications for tax incidence on savings and on in-
vestment.5 Using a two-country exogenous growth model with the perfect
5See, for example, Sinn (1987, pp. 195-197) for more detail of the residence and source
principles.
20capital mobility but no labor mobility, Bovenberg (1989), Christensen and
Nielsen (1995), Frenkel and Razin (1989), Ihori (1991), Nielsen (1992), Sib-
ert (1990) and Sorensen (1990) have studied the international spillover eﬀects
of taxation. The most closely related studies to our focus are Ihori (1991),
Sibert (1990) and Sorensen (1990), which highlight the eﬀects of residence
and source taxes in an overlapping generations model. They also show in-
ternational conﬂicts created by a source tax reform. While an increase in
the home residence tax rate decreases the capital stock in both countries,
an increase in the source tax rate decreases the capital stock in the home
country, but increases it in the foreign country (Ihori, 1991, Sorensen, 1990).
When the current accounts of the two countries are balanced initially, resi-
dence taxes lower the welfare of both countries. However, the welfare eﬀect
of source taxes is positive on the foreign country and negative on the home
country (Sibert, 1990. She actually stresses that the existence of large ini-
tial current account imbalances may reverse these welfare implications). The
most crucial diﬀerence between their models and ours is that we consider an
endogenously growing world economy.
6.2 Interactions Between Taxation and Economic Growth
in Open Economies
In multi-country endogenous growth models, a country’s tax policy could af-
fect other countries’ long-run growth rates. This eﬀect on the foreign growth
rates produces a new channel of international conﬂicts arising from tax pol-
icy, and hence, analyzing international sipillover eﬀects of taxation in en-
dogenous growth models is quite important. Rebelo (1991), Razin and Yuen
(1994, 1996) and Buiter and Kletzer (1991, 1993, 1995) are seminal works
along this line. They obtain novel, but mixed, implications.
Rebelo (1991) gives a brief sketch of the tax eﬀects in a two-country model
w i t hA Kt e c h n o l o g ya n da ni n ﬁnite-horizon representative agent. An increase
in the residence tax rate lowers the after-tax interest rate and the economic
growth rate in the home country. This is because the Euler equation of the
inﬁnite horizon agent determines the positive relationship between the after-
21t a xi n t e r e s tr a t ea n dt h eg r o w t hr a t e .H o w e v e r ,i td o e sn o th a v ea n ye ﬀects
on the rest of the world. The assumption of AK technology produces more
striking results regarding the eﬀects of source taxes. Production activity
concentrates in the country which has the highest after-source-tax interest
rate. If the countries have the same production technology, production is
undertaken in the country with the lowest source tax rate. Only the lowest
source tax rate in the world matters for the world economy. Its increase
lowers the growth rate of all countries.
Buiter and Kletzer (1991, 1993, 1995) examine sources of growth rate
diﬀerentials by employing a two-country overlapping generations model in
w h i c he c o n o m i cg r o w t hi sd r i v e nb yt h ea c c u m u l a t i o no fh u m a nc a p i t a l .T h e
residence-based nonhuman capital income tax makes investment in human
capital relatively attractive, and more accumulation of human capital leads to
a higher growth rate. The source tax raises the home country wage rate and is
likely to bring a higher rate of growth. Since the human capital is non-traded,
ad i ﬀerence in tax policies can be a cause of international growth diﬀerentials
through a diﬀerence in the accumulation of country-speciﬁc human capital.
Adding the endogenous fertility feature, Razin and Yuen (1994, 1996)
show a more complicated story. In their two-country model, the inﬁnite
horizon dynasty has four measures of investment: physical capital at home,
physical capital abroad, quality of children (increases in human capital) and
quantity of children (increase in population). The residence tax makes the
latter two measures more attractive. When investment in human capital
responds signiﬁcantly, the residence tax brings a higher per capita growth rate
of national income. However, lower population growth oﬀsets this increase,
keeping the total income growth rate unchanged. The source tax does not
create any growth rate diﬀerentials across the countries, but the world growth
rate falls.
Our model incorporates a diﬀerent mechanism of endogenous growth, that
is, Arrow (1962) - Romer (1986) style production externalities, and we have
proposed another story of how tax aﬀects the growth rates of each country.
In our model, it is assumed that the output of a country is aﬀected by the
22capital stock in the foreign country (which is a proxy of knowledge in the for-
eign country) as well as that in the domestic country. Speciﬁcations similar
to our spirit are employed in the theoretical analysis of Alogoskouﬁsa n dv a n
der Ploeg (1991), Fukuda (1993) and Mino (1996). Like the AK models, the
production technology in our model exhibits constant returns to scale with
respect to nonhuman capital accumulation, and this property yields balanced
growth paths. We also assume production externalities prevail across bor-
ders. Thus the productivity of capital in each country depends on the world
capital stock. In this setting, a contrast to Rebelo’s (1991) and Buiter and
Kletzer’s (1991, 1993, 1995) arguments, any diﬀerences in the tax system
cannot be a source of growth rate diﬀerentials. The international conﬂicts
through the growth rate eﬀects disappear in the long run.
Razin and Yuen’s (1994, 1996) results come from the assumption of en-
dogenous fertility. While tax policy may aﬀect the per-capita growth rate
of income through distorting incentives to investment in human capital, the
endogenously determined population growth rate oﬀsets the movement of the
per-capita growth rate, maintaining the equality of the total income growth
rates. Since population is ﬁx e di no u rm o d e l ,t h eu n d e r l y i n gg r o w t hr a t e
equalizing mechanism is totally diﬀerent from that of their model. Here, the
production externalities are crucial to equalizing the growth rates of the two
countries.
Our result shows that the tax eﬀe c to ng r o w t hr a t ed i ﬀerentials varies
with the speciﬁc a t i o no ft h em o d e l .O n ec a n n o td e t e r m i n ei tb yt h e o r y ,per
se. In Grossman and Helpman’s (1991, chapters 7 and 8) model, where the
knowledge is accumulated by R&D expenditures, the international spillover
o fk n o w l e d g ei sc r u c i a lt ot h eg r o w t hr a t ed i ﬀerentials. While the growth rate
of each country does not converge in the absence of international spillover of
knowledge, it ultimately shares the same growth rate with the presence of
spillover. Without labor mobility across borders, the international spillover
seems to be more diﬃcult to justify than that within a country. Since
the literature has pointed out that patent licensing or international trade
contributes to the spillover of knowledge, however, labor immobility cannot
23preclude the international spillover. The international knowledge spillovers
through licensing and trade have been empirically conﬁrmed by recent studies
including Bayoumi, Coe and Helpman (1999), Bernstein and Mohnen (1998),
Branstetter (2001), Coe and Helpman (1995), Coe, Helpman and Hoﬀmaister
(1997), Eaton and Kortum (1996, 1997, 1999) and Keller (2002).6
6.3 Intergenerational Considerations
Closed economy models of endogenous growth with overlapping generations
are developed by several authors, such as Saint-Paul (1992) and Grossman
and Yanagawa (1993). They show that welfare properties of overlapping gen-
erations models are signiﬁcantly modiﬁed once the long-run growth rate has
been endogenized. For example, introduction of a pay-as-you-go type public
pension reduces the long-run growth rate, and, thereby, always decreases the
w e l f a r el e v e l so fs u ﬃciently distant future generations.
Pioneering works of multi-country endogenous growth models with over-
lapping generations are Alogoskouﬁs and van der Ploeg (1991) and Buiter
and Kletzer (1991, 1993). Alogoskouﬁs and van der Ploeg (1991) investigate
the eﬀects of budgetary policy on the growth rate and the current account,
while Buiter and Kletzer (1991, 1993) examine the eﬀects of taxation on the
growth rate. However, neither of them are concerned with the intergenera-
tional equity issue partially because, we guess, the presence of a transition
path makes the analysis intractable. Since the world economy in our model
converges immediately to a new steady growth path as in other AK models,
the welfare of each generation grows at a constant rate. This property makes
it possible for us to obtain the tax eﬀects on each generation’s welfare with
as i n g l ee q u a t i o n .
Building a two-country continuous-time overlapping generations model
with exogenous growth, Christensen and Nielsen (1995) focus on diﬀerent
generational consequences of source tax reform. They point out that a higher
source tax in the domestic country hurts the foreign households at the time
of a policy change, whereas it will make future foreign households better oﬀ.
6Keller (2004) and Aghion and Howitt (1998, chapter 11) survey the issue.
24Although both their paper and ours contrast the welfare eﬀects of diﬀerent
generations in the foreign country, their direction is opposite due to a dif-
ference in underlying mechanisms. An increase in the domestic source tax
r a t er a i s e st h ew a g ei nt h ef o r e i g nc o u n t r yb e c a u s et h ec a p i t a ls t o c kﬂows
into the foreign country. In an exogenous growth model like Christensen and
Nielsen (1995), future generations beneﬁtf r o mt h i sw a g ei n c r e a s e .H o w e v e r ,
in the short run, older generations, who have already accumulated large cap-
ital, suﬀer from a reduction of capital income, because the inﬂow of capital
stock lowers the interest rate. By considering a continuous-time overlap-
ping generations model where young generations are roughly a labor income
owner and older generations rely on capital income, Christensen and Nielsen
(1995) reveal a kind of class conﬂict, which two-period overlapping gener-
ations models have dismissed. Nielsen (1992) provides a similar point in
examining a residence tax and an investment tax credit. Since our model is
a two-period overlapping generations model, a reasoning of intergenerational
conﬂicts comes from a diﬀerent place: a distinction between the level eﬀect
and the growth rate.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Using a two-country overlapping generations model with endogenous growth
and perfect capital mobility, this paper has studied the international and
intergenerational aspects of capital income taxation. The eﬀects of capital
income taxation on the welfare of each generation in each country have been
particularly focused on. The international production externalities equalize
the growth rates of the two countries. Therefore, the diﬀerences in tax sys-
tems cannot cause any growth rate diﬀerentials, unlike in Rebelo’s (1991)
AK model without externalities.
T h ef a c tt h a tc o u n t r i e sw i t hd i ﬀe r e n tt a xr a t e ss h a r et h es a m eg r o w t hr a t e
produces novel implications for the spillover eﬀect of tax policy. The source
tax shifts the capital stock from the home country to the foreign country.
This eﬀect works to raise the welfare of the foreign country. However, the
25increase in the source tax rate lowers the growth rate of the world economy.
As a result, later generations will be damaged, while earlier generations ben-
eﬁt from the tax reform. Thus, the foreign country faces intergenerational
conﬂicts, which have not been seen in previous exogenous growth models.
Since both countries suﬀer from the lower economic growth rate caused by
the taxes, we do not see, in the long-run, the international conﬂict which the
literature on exogenous growth has stressed.
This ﬁnding suggests that the underlying structure of the model may be
important in identifying the sources of divergent growth among countries
(However, the tax policy creates the income level diﬀerences on the balanced
growth path). More theoretical and empirical works are called for to deter-
mine whether there is a force to converge the growth rates of countries. In
the present paper, we have provided a case where this line of research is of
importance to policy debates.
26Appendices
A1 :W e l f a r eE ﬀect of Residence Tax
From Roy’s identity and (17), we have
V1
V2
=( 1+β)s(β)[f(α) − f
0(α)α] ¯ Kt, (A1)
where Vi is the partial derivative of V with respect to its i-th argument.
Next consider the change in public goods associated with a tax policy
change. Diﬀerentiating (13) with respect to tax rates and evaluating it at











dσ∗ =0 . (A3)
From these results we can derive the welfare eﬀect of capital income taxation.
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With (A2) and (A5), the total eﬀe c t so nt h ew e l f a r ei se v a l u a t e da s
dV t/dρ
V2(1 + g)t−1 ¯ K0
+
det+1/dρ
V2 (1 + g)
t−1 ¯ K0
= −
f0 (α)s(β)[f (α) − f0 (α)α](1+g)
1+β
+
f0 (α)α(1 + g)
2
V2 (1 + δ)






(A6) takes a nasty form because our governmental policy creates an unwanted
welfare eﬀect which is represented by the ﬁrst and second terms of the right
hand side. These terms appear because the beneﬁt of the additional supply
27of public goods does not equal the opportunity costs of resources devoted to
t h es u p p l y . T h i st e r mm a yb ep o s i t i v eo rn e g a t i v ed e p e n d i n go nt h el e v e l
of public goods supply. We can make these terms simpler if we assume an
alternative policy assumption under which revenues from capital taxes are
returned to the older generations with a lump-sum form. In this setting,







holds, the welfare eﬀect becomes simpler:
dV t/dρ
V2(1 + g)t−1 ¯ K0
+
det+1/dρ






0 (α){s(β)[f (α) − f










To obtain the third line of (A8), we have used b =0in the no-tax state for
the symmetric countries. However, the ﬁn a le q u a t i o no f( A 8 )i sv a l i de v e n
when b 6=0:Using b =0 , we have already eliminated a term in de/dρ of
(A2). This term exactly chancels the ﬁrst term in the second line of (A8).
The eﬀects on the foreign households are much simpler because the resi-
dence tax does not aﬀect the after-tax interest rate of the foreign households.
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A2 : W e l f a r eE ﬀect of Source Tax
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28Adding det+1/dρ to (A9) and dividing it by V2(1 + g)t−1 ¯ K0 and substi-
tuting the results obtained in table 1 and (25) into it yields
dV t/dσ
V2(1 + g)t−1 ¯ K0
+
det+1/dσ
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Again, substituting (A7) in (A10) yields
dV t/dσ
V2(1 + g)t−1 ¯ K0
+
det+1/dσ
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For the foreign households, a similar calculation makes
dV t/dσ∗



























[1] Aghion, Philippe and Peter Howitt, Endogenous Growth Theory,C a m -
bridge, MA: The MIT Press (1998).
[2] Alogoskouﬁs, George S. and Frederick van der Ploeg, "On Budgetary
Policies, Growth and External Deﬁcits in an Interdependent World,"
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 5 (1991):305-24.
[3] Arrow. Kenneth J., "The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing,"
Review of Economic Studies 29 (1962):155-173.
[4] Bayoumi, Tamim, David T. Coe and Eihanan Helpman, "R&D
Spillovers and Global Growth," Journal of International Economics 47
(1999):399-428.
[5] Bernstein, J. I. and P. Mohnen, "International R&D Spillovers between
U.S. and Japanese R&D Intensive Sectors," Journal of International
Economics 44 (1998):315-38.
[ 6 ]B o v e n b e r g ,A .L a n s ," T h eE ﬀects of Capital Income Taxation on Inter-
national Competitiveness and Trade Flows," American Economic Re-
view 79 (1989):1045-64.
[7] Bovenberg, A. Lans, "Residence- and Source-based Taxation of Capital
Income in an Overlapping Generations Model," Journal of Economics
56 (1992):267-295.
[8] Branstetter, Lee G., "Are Knowledge Spillovers International or Intrana-
tional in Scope? Microeconometric Evidence from the U.S. and Japan,"
Journal of International Economics 53 (2001): 53—79.
[9] Buiter, Willem H. and Kenneth M. Kletzer, "Persistent Diﬀerences in
National Productivity Growth Rates with a Common Technology and
Free Capital Mobility; The Roles of Public Debt, Capital Taxation and
Policy Towards Human Capital Formation," Journal of the Japanese
and International Economies 5 (1991):325-53.
[10] Buiter, Willem H. and Kenneth M. Kletzer, "Permanent International
Productivity Growth Diﬀerentials in an Integrated Global Economy,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 95 (1993):467-93.
[11] Buiter, Willem H. and Kenneth M. Kletzer, "Capital Mobility, Fiscal
Policy, and Growth under Self-ﬁnancing of Human Capital Formation,"
Canadian Journal of Economics 28 (1995):S163-94.
[12] Christensen, Thomas Alslev and Soren Bo Nielsen, "International
Repercussions of Source-based Capital Income Taxation," Journal of
Economic Integration 10 (1995):87-110.
30[13] Coe, David T. and Elhanan Helpman, "International R&D Spillovers,"
European Economic Review 39 (1995):859-87.
[14] Coe, David T., Elhanan Helpman and Alexander W. Hoﬀmaister, 1997,
"North-South R&D Spillovers," Economic Journal 107 (1997):134-49.
[15] Eaton, Jonathan and Samuel Kortum, "Trade in Ideas: Patenting and
Productivity in the OECD," Journal of International Economics 40
(1996):251-78.
[16] Eaton, Jonathan and Samuel Kortum, "Engines of Growth: Domestic
and Foreign Sources of Innovation," Japan and the World Economy 9
(1997):235-59.
[17] Eaton, Jonathan and Samuel Kortum, "International Technology Dif-
fusion: Theory and Measurement," International Economic Review 40
(1999):537-70.
[18] Frenkel, Jacob A., and Assaf Razin, "International Eﬀects of Tax Re-
forms," Economic Journal 98 (1989):38-58.
[19] Fukuda, Shin-ich, "International Transmission of Monetary and Fiscal
Policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 17 (1993):589-620.
[20] Grilliches, Zvi, "The Search for R&D Spillovers," Scandinavian Journal
of Economics 94 (1992): S29-47.
[21] Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman, Innovation and Growth in
the Global Economy, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press (1991).
[22] Grossman, Gene M. and Noriyuki Yanagawa, "Asset Bubbles and En-
dogenous Growth," Journal of Monetary Economics 31 (1993):3-19.
[23] Ihori, Toshihiro, "Capital Income Taxation in a World Economy: A
Territorial System Versus a Residence System," Economic Journal 101
(1991):958-65.
[24] Iwamoto, Yasushi and Akihisa Shibata, "Capital Income Taxation and
the Current Account in a Small Open Economy," Journal of Interna-
tional Money and Finance 10 (1991):480-96.
[25] Iwamoto, Yasushi and Akihisa Shibata, "Foreign Tax Credit and the
Current Account," International Tax and Public Finance 6 (1999):131-
48.
[26] Keller, Wolfgang, "Trade and the Transmission of Thecnology," Journal
of Economic Growth 7 (2002):5-24.
31[27] Keller, Wolfgang, "International Technology Diﬀusion," Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature 42 (2004): 752-82.
[28] Mino, Kazuo, "Technological spillovers and capital mobility in a two-
country model of Economic Growth," in Ryuzo Sato, Hajime Hori and
Rama V. Ramachandran eds, Organization, Performance and Equity:
Perspectives on the Japanese Economy, Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic
Publishers (1996).
[29] Nielsen, Soren Bo, "Capital Income Taxation in a Growing World Econ-
omy," Journal of Economics 55 (1992):77-99.
[30] Nielsen, Soren Bo and Peter Birch Sorensen, "Capital Income Taxa-
tion in a Growing Open Economy," European Economics Review 34
(1991):179-97.
[31] Razin, A. and Chi-Wa Yuen, "Convergence in Growth Rates: A Quan-
titative Assessment of the Role of Capital Mobility and International
Taxation," in Leonardo Leiderman and Assaf Razin eds, Capital Mobil-
ity: The Impact on Consumption, Investment and Growth,C a m b r i d g e :
Cambridge University Press (1994).
[32] Razin, Assaf and Chi-Wa Yuen, "Capital Income Taxation and Long-
run Growth: New Perspectives," Journal of Public Economics 59
(1996):239-63.
[ 3 3 ] R e b e l o ,S é r g i o ," G r o w t hi nO p e nE c o n o m i e s , "Carnegie-Rochester Con-
ference Series on Public Policy 36 (1991):5-46.
[34] Romer, Paul, "Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth," Journal of
Political Economy 94 (1986):1002-37.
[35] Saint-Paul, Gilles, "Fiscal Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (1992):1243-60.
[36] Sibert, Anne, "Taxing Capital in a Large, Open Economy," Journal of
Public Economics 41 (1990):297-317.
[37] Sinn, Hans-Werner, Capital Income Taxation and Resource Allocation,
Amsterdam: North-Holland (1987).
[38] Sorensen, Peter Birch, "Welfare Gains from International Fiscal Coor-
dination," in R. Prud’homme ed., Public Finance with Several Levels
of Governments: Proceedings of the 46th Congress of the International
Institute of Public Finance (1990):329-342.
[39] Summers, Lawrence H., "Tax Policy and International Competitive-
ness," in Jacob A. Frenkel ed., International Aspects of Fiscal Policies,
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (1988).
32Figure 1    The welfare effect on foreign households 
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